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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No.

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

910165

vs.
KELLEY ROWE,
Category No. 14
Defendant-Respondent.
—oooOooo—
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to
the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to
hear the case under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp.
1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the majority of the court of appeals

erroneously conclude that a violation of the nighttime search
warrant authorization provision, Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5
(1990), constitute a constitutional violation of such that,
the "exclusionary rule" is applicable?

Did the majority of

the court of appeals erroneously conclude that the officers
1

acted in "bad faith" in executing the search warrant.
2.

Did the majority of the court of appeals

erroneously conclude that the status of being an "invited
guest" in a third-party's home "vests" the guest with a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence such that
the guest may challenge the validity of a search warrant for
the home?

Does, inversely, a guest lose his/her

constitutional protections and freedoms from unreasonable
searches at a front door?
3.

Did the majority of the court of appeals

erroneously conclude that the state mi ist pr- :)ve a defendantf s
abandonment of an expectation of privacy by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence"?
CONSTITUTIONAL PRQYISI QMSu ^lAIIIlfiS^ND. RULES
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
for a determination of this case are, i n pertinent part:
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-5 (1990) . Issuance of
warrant — Time and place arrests may be
made.
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest
upon finding probable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a public
offense. If the offense charge is: (1) a felony,
the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time
of the day or night.
Utah Code Annotated §77-23-5 (1990).
for service -- Officer may request

2

Time

assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in
the [search] warrant that it be served in the
daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony
state a reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or
altered, or for other good reason; in which case he
may insert a direction that it be served any time
of the day or night. An officer may request other
persons to assist him in conducting the search.
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 (1990).
Force used
in executing warrant —
Notice of authority
prerequisite,
when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the
officer executing the warrant may use such force as
is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority
and purpose, there is no response or he is not
admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant
directs in the warrant that the officer need not
give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only
upon proof, under oath, that the object of the
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Keeley Laursen Rowe, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance

(methamphetamine), a

third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-378(2) (a) (i) and (b) (ii) (Supp. 1989)

(R. 1 0 ) .

Prior to trial,

defendant-respondent moved to suppress the evidence seized

3

pursuant to a search warrant executed on a third-party ! s home
in which she was present (R. 28-31).

The matter was

considered without hearing, denying defendant-respondent the
opportunity to more clearly evidence her standing and to
respond to the state's position.

The matter was ruled upon

based on the written memoranda submitted l y fife parties, and
denied (R. 32-41, 51-55, 60-61).
Subsequently, defendant-respondent waived her right to a
jury; a bench trial was held on March 21, 1989, in the Fifth
Judicial District Court, Washington County, Utah (R. 50, 6265; T. 5 ) . During trial, defendant-respondent reasserted her
motion to suppress the evidence (T. ; 8, 104-05) ,
was again denied

T. 108). Defendant-respondent was

convicted as crargea \ n . oo; i. 1 8 1 ) ,
was sentenced

The motion

Defendant-respondent

"he statutory indeterminate term of zero to

five years; but, imprisonment was stayed and defendantrespondent was placed

on probation (R. 80-84).

Defendant-

respondent was not granted the opportunity to be heard and
either present a reply or evidence in opposition to the
state f s asser til ons
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a split
decisioi
* -.-:

. eversed defendant's conviction and remanded the
AI t i: :i a 1 , coi icl u ling that (1! ) the sea rcl l wa rrar it

improperly authorized a nighttime search, (2) the remedy for
4

a defective nighttime search authorization was suppression,
(3) the "good-faith" exception of Leon did not apply (4)
defendant-respondent, as an "invited guest" in a thirdparty's home, had an expectation of privacy in the home
sufficient to allow her to challenge the search warrant, and
(5) defendant-respondent had not abandoned an expectation of
privacy in her purse left in the home.

State v. Rowef 806

P.2d 730 (Utah App.), cert, granted,, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
(Utah July 3, 1991).
On April 9, 1991, the state timely filed a petition for
writ of certiorari in this Court.

On July 3, 1991, the

petition was granted.
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant was issued and
executed which authorized police to search for narcotics in
the residence of Stan Swickey in Leeds, Utah.

The warrant

contained provisions which allowed police to enter "day or
night," and to effect the search without notice, i.e., on a
"no-knock" basis. The warrant was issued based on
information in the officer's supporting affidavit that a
confidential informant had been contacted by Swickey, who
told the informant that he, Swickey, had picked up a quantity
of methamphetamine and marijuana that was being stored at his
home in Leeds. The affidavit in support of the warrant
5

contained preprinted language which stated that the affiant
reasonably believed that the property sought could be easily
destroyed or hidden or that harm to officers could result
from notice. Following this language are two boxes that the
affiant can check, and which were checked, to request
nighttime and "no-knock" authority.

No other factual

information supports these requests.
The warrant was executed on a "no-knock" basis on
October 7, 1988, at approximately 11:30 p.m.

When police

entered Swickeyfs apartment, they found eight people, in
addition to Swickey, in the home. Everyone except defendantrespondent was in the living room playing cards around a
table.

Defendant-respondent was in the kitchen. After

securing the home, the officers had defendant-respondent join
the other people in the living room, while Swickey was taken
into the kitchen and placed under arrest, pursuant to an
arrest warrant, and advised of the search warrant. Another
individual was arrested when the officers saw drugs nearby,
in plain view.

The remaining individuals, including

defendant-respondent, were told they could leave the
premises.

Defendant-respondent did not have her shoes, and

asked if she could go to the bedroom to retrieve them. An
officer accompanied her to the room, where she took the shoes
from a pile of items. The officer asked her if she had
6

everything that was hers from that room. Defendantrespondent replied that she did.
After defendant-respondent left, the officers conducted
a search of the home. Narcotics were found throughout the
house.

A purse was seized from the pile in the bedroom from

which defendant-respondent had retrieved her shoes. Inside
the purse was a small brown vial which contained
methamphetamine.

Also in the purse were several documents

that revealed that the purse belonged to defendantrespondent.
Police contacted defendant-respondent the next day and
advised her that they had a purse that belonged to her.
came down to the station and was arrested.

She

After being

advised of her Miranda rights, defendant-respondent admitted
that the purse and vial of drugs were hers.

She told police

that she had been ""ripping off" drugs from Swickey.
Prior to trial, defendant-respondent filed a motion to
suppress the vial and other contents seized from her purse.
The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities.

The state filed a memorandum opposing

defendant's motion to suppress, and requested a ruling on
defendant's motion.

On March 17, 1989, the court issued a

written order denying defendant's motion.
Defendant-respondent waived her right to a jury trial,
7

and a bench trial commenced on March 21, 1989.

During the

trial, defendant-respondent again renewed her motion to
suppress.

The basis of her argument was that the search

warrant was defective since the supporting affidavit did not
support the nighttime or "no-knock" authorization.

The state

argued that "Mr. Swickey would be the only one to have
standing to object to that," and also argued the merits of
the claim.

The court denied the renewed motion.

Defendant-

respondent was convicted as charged.
Defendant-respondent raised three issues on appeal, all
of which challenge the district court's failure to suppress
the items seized from defendant's purse:

(1) Whether there

was sufficient factual information in the supporting
affidavit to authorize a nighttime search, (2) whether there
was sufficient factual information in the supporting
affidavit to authorize a "no-knock" search, and (3) whether
the search was defective since the warrant was dated
subsequent to the search.
Court of Appeals decision.

Case factual statement taken from
State v. Rowef 80 6 P.2d 730

(Ut.App. 1991).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court denied the motion to suppress without hearing.
The defendant-respondent filed a motion with the court and
was awaiting response from the state prior to the time of
8

trial.

The defendant-respondent received plaintiff's

response to the motion as well as the Judge's decision
denying the motion within the same week of the trial date.
Transcript page 8, lines 6-11.
The court did not allow the defendant-respondent a
factual hearing nor did the court make any factual findings
on the record in the denial of said motion.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

See Rule 12,

Rule 12(c).

In essence,

the trial court denied defendant-respondent the opportunity
to respond to the issue of standing and to evidence at
hearing her rights to be in the home.

Based thereon, the

defendant-respondent asserts:
(1) A guest in a home has standing to object to an
illegal search of her personal property found within the
home.

This issue is resolved by a finding that the

defendant-respondent had a legitimate and recognized right or
expectation of privacy in her own personal property.

She did

not forfeit these rights at the door's front.
(2)

Abandonment did not exist. By leaving her purse

behind under the stress of the situation, the respondent did
not manifest the necessary intent to abandon her purse in the
home.

The warrant may not give the police blanket authority

to search the property of others found within a home.

Either

forgetting the purse or a disclaimer of the person was forced

by the unlawful search and the attendant search of each
guest.

Neither arises to the level of "abandonment".

(3)

Suppression is the only remedy available.

If not

recognized, the statute imposing additional protections or
precautions for nighttime searches, is essentially avoided
and circumvented.

It would be idealistic to believe police

and magistrates cautiously watch over the civil rights of our
citizens.

Unavoidable is the fact situation present here.

A

magistrate rubber stamps conclusions of police officers who
simply check off boxes on a pre-set form.

The protection

granted by constitutional mandate requires greater sanctions.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENT HAS STANDING TO ATTACK THE VALIDITY
OF THE WARRANT BECAUSE HER PERSONAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT*WERE VIOLATED.
The lower court allowed the State to raise the standing
issue.

The respondent asserts the necessary standing to

challenge the legality of the search existed.

If this Court

does not so agree, the defendant-respondent should be given
an opportunity to be heard on that issue at an evidentiary
hearing.

The United States Supreme Court has abandoned an

automatic standing rule based on being present or being
charged with a crime involving possession in favor of one

10

that is based on an individual violation of a
constitutionally protected interest.

See United States v.

Salvucci. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
The proponent of a motion to suppress must show that
their own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure.
130, 131 N. 1 (1978) .

Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S.

The standard is the same under the

United State Constitution and under the Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 12.

See State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d

1256, 126-27 (Utah 1987); State V. IaCQHQ, 725 P.2d 1375,
1377-78 (Utah 1986);

State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Ut.

App. 1989); State V, DeAlQ, 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Ut. App.
1987).
Under the standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court the
defendant-respondent has standing^to challenge the search.

A

violation of her personal rights occurred when the officers
searched her personal property, a purse.

A purse of which

she was essentially forced to leave at the residence,
otherwise, she was to submit to a further search of herself
and the purse.
constitution.

A purse is property protected under the
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it has been the law
11

that "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims
the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois/ 439
U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d

387 (1978). A

subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is
["]one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable,['"] id. at 143-144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12,
quoting Katz, suprar at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).

Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109

L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).

The state's position that defendant-

respondent failed to establish standing based on the nature
of her presence in Swickeyfs home is not compelling•
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded "that Olson's
status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he
had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Xd. 110 S.Ct. at 1688.
In this case, the evidence did not establish that defendantrespondent was an overnight guest in Swickeyfs home on the
night of the search.

There is, however, uncontroverted

evidence that defendant-respondent had an intimate
relationship with Swickey, which continued to the time of the
incident.

She had stayed overnight in the home on several

prior occasions.

She had placed her personal items as her
12

purse in the bedroom.

At the time of the search, she was in

the kitchen preparing (heating) drinks for all the guests.
Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest has such
standing.

Olson suggests that a social visit of a duration

less than overnight would not deprive a guest of standing.
In this case, defendant-respondent felt secure enough in
the home to remove her shoes, leave her purse beyond her
view, and roam to rooms other than where her fellow guests
were playing cards. Eschewing an analysis based on free
access and right to exclude others, the Olson Court focused
on the social tradition that
hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy
interests of their guests, who are entitled to a
legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact
that they have no legal interest in the premises
and do not have the legal authority to determine
who may or may not enter the household.
Id. at 1698.
A standing challenge in the search and seizure context
is resolved by a determination of "whether governmental
officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy."

Rawlinqs v. Kentucky/ 448 u.s. 98 106, 100 s.ct. 2556, 2562,
65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

The defendant's status as an invited

guest in the home vested her with a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the home.

She would expect that her personal

rights of privacy would be honored and respected.

13

She

expected reasonably that she and her property would not be
abused or violated.

She thereby gained sufficient standing

to challenge the validity of the search warrant and the
resulting search of her purse.
She was at the place searched, and it was her property
that was searched.

Most importantly, it was her personal

rights that were violated when the police searched through
her purse.
A similar case is cited by the state, Rawlings v.
Kentucky. 448 U.S. 97 (1980).

In Rawlings the court did not

find a personal violation sufficient to allow standing to the
defendant not because it was a purse searched but because it
was not his purse searched and he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy that society was willing to recognize
in the purse. Again, Mr. Swickey here may not have standing
to object to the search of another's property, but Ms. Rowe
does.
In Rawlings the police entered a home with an arrest
warrant for the occupant.

Inside the home they smelled

marijuana smoke and found several people present. An officer
left the home to obtain a search warrant while the remaining
officers detained the occupants. The police were willing to
let anyone leave if they would consent to a body search.
When the officer returned with a search warrant, he directed
14

one of the occupants, a Ms. Vanessa Cox, to empty her purse
on the coffee table.
narcotics.

The contents partly consisted of

After dumping out her purse, she turned to the

man next to her, Mr. Rawlings, and told him to take what was
his.

He took the drugs and at his trial motioned to suppress

the evidence as the product of an illegal search.

The U.S.

Supreme Court rejected this claim because he did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in Ms. Cox's purse,

id. at

104.
In the case at bar, it is the owner of the purse who is
claiming a violation of her constitutionally protected
rights, not the home owner.

She clearly has standing to

contest the legality of the search of her own personal
property.
The respondent has the requisite standing to challenge
the validity of the search.
EflINT II
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT INTEND TO ABANDON HER PURSE
WHEN SHE LEFT THE HOME DURING THE POLICE SEARCH.
The state claims the respondent abandoned any reasonable
expectation of privacy she may have had in her purse by
leaving it in a place she knew would be searched.

The

standard of abandonment for property law is different in some
respects from the standard for Fourth Amendment standing.
However, the two standards are the same in one important
15

respect, both require an intent to abandon.

"The [court]

must focus on the intent of the person who is alleged to have
abandoned the place or object. The test is an objective one,
and intent may be inferred from fwords-spoken, acts done, and
other objective facts.'". United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d
843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .
Objectively looking at the circumstances under which the
respondent left her purse in the house, the State cannot and
does not show an intent to abandon.
burden.

It is the state's

People v. Conreras. infra. The officers had burst

into the house without knocking, and after sweeping the home
for people, rounded everyone up in the living room. The
defendant was escorted into the bedroom by a police officer
to get her shoes so she could go home.

She retrieved her

things from a pile of clothing on the floor and thinking she
had all that was hers left the home. The defendant did not
intend to give up ownership of her purse and its contents to
Mr. Swickey.

It is more likely that under the stress of the

situation and her haste to leave the stressful situation of a
police search of a home, she merely forgot her purse.
However, "abandonment must be distinguished from a mere
disclaimer of a property interest made to the police prior to
the search, which under the better view does not defeat
standing."

United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763-64
16

(8th Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§11.3, at 548-49 (1978)).
Whether defendant-respondent had abandoned her purse,
under search and seizure analysis, is primarily a factual
question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable
expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from "words
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." Thomasf 864
F.2d at 846 (quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174,

176 (5th cir. 1973)).

See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d

200, 429 P.2d 47, 48 (1967) (abandonment ordinarily a
question for the factfinder to be determined from the facts
and circumstances). The burden of proving abandonment falls

on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450, 259
Cal.Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be shown by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence." Friedman v. United
States, 347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir. 1675).

See alSQ United

States v. Boswell 347 A.2d 270 274 (D.C. 1975); Q'Shauqhnessy
v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982).

It "is

measured from the vantage point" of the defendant, and not
the police. Narain v. State, 79 Md.App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158,
1161 n. 4 (1989).

"It is only the [defendant's] state of

mind that counts."

It is from the available facts that the

issue is resolved.

Much as when the state's case must

evidence a "specific intent" crime.
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Defendant Rowe was allowed to leave the party along with
Swickey's other guests; however, subject to the search. She
was conducted to the bedroom to retrieve her shoes and was
given the opportunity to claim any other property belonging
to her. When asked by the police officer if anything else
belonged to her, she stated that she had retrieved everything
in the bedroom that was hers.

That repudiation of interest

in property located the bedroom is consistent with a
conclusion of abandonment.

It is not, however, inconsistent

with a conclusion of mere disclaimer of interest to avoid
self-incrimination.

The state failed to produce evidence

which would develop this issue and perhaps meet its burden of
proving abandonment under search and seizure analysis.
Accordingly, abandonment in the Fourth Amendment sense was
not established by the state.
POINT III
GOOD FAITH AND AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
(DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT RELIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY
UPON THE RULINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION.
BASED THEREON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ADOPTS ALMOST ENTIRELY
THE RULINGS THEREIN.)
The state further claims the search can be
validated by the officer's good faith reliance on
the deficient warrant. United States v. Leon . 468
U.S. 897, 920-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3419-20, 82
L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring
unlawful police conduct, does not bar evidence
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obtained by officers acting in good faith reliance
on a defective warrant. id. But the Leon doctrine
. is not without limitations. When the magistrate
reviewing the affidavit in support of the search
warrant is not presented with sufficient facts to
determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be
relied upon by searching officers. Id* 468 U.S. at
915, 104 S.Ct. at 3417. The Court determined that
there was nothing in the affidavit in this case
that would offer any basis to the magistrate for a
finding of probable cause to allow a nighttime
search. It appears from the record that the
endorsement of the nighttime authorization was done
in impermissible "rubber stamp" fashion. See
Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509,
1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
Any officer, cognizant of his responsibility to uphold
constitutional guarantees, should easily recognize the
impermissibility of rubber stamp warrants.
The question of the officer's good faith
reliance is subject to de novo determination by

this court. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d
1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). The conduct of the
officers executing the search warrant must be
objectively reasonable. Leop, 468 U.S. at 919, 104
S.Ct. at 3419.
Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous
statutory directive to present the magistrate with
"reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary
in the night," Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(1) (1990),
and then claim that their very failure to do so is
objectively reasonable conduct on their part. See
Leonr 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 n.
20 (objective standard requires reasonable
knowledge of the law by police officers); United
States V, Freitas, 610 F.Supp. 1560, 1572 (N.D.Cal.
1985) (police agency must train officers, who have
obligation to ensure that warrant comports with
constitutional law), aff'df 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.
1986) .
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In this case, the same officer prepared the affidavit,
secured the warrant, and executed the search. He had
personal knowledge of the affidavit's contents.

They were so

cavalier in its preparation that the magistrate was dated subsequent to the search. A Leon exception should not be
utilized to circumvent constitutional protections or to cover
"sloppy" police work.
Having so concluded, we must now turn our
attention to whether the warrant's issuance in
violation of the nighttime search requirements
necessitates suppression of the evidence seized,
namely the drugs and other items found in the
defendant's purse. We recognize that mere
ministerial and technical errors in the preparation
or execution of search warrants will not, without
more, invalidate the warrant. See, e.g., State v.
Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah, 1988) (violation
of "knock-and-announce" rule did not require
suppression when no one was at home at the time of
the search to respond to the knock). Cf. State v.
Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989)
(suppression may be appropriate for violation of
constitution, statute, or administrative
regulation).
However, where a statute establishes
procedures for protection of substantive rights,
such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the
statute cannot be dismissed as technical or
ministerial in nature and suppression of the
evidence gained from the challenged search is the
appropriate remedy. Awaya v. Statef 5 Haw.App.
547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not
particularly described in the warrant required
suppression), c&sL. denied. 7 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d
781 (1985); Wiqqin V. State 755 P.2d 115, 117
(Okla.Crim.App. 1988) (violation of statute similar
to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression)/ State v.
20

roylQ. 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980)
(suppression required for violation of notice
requirement). But, see State v. Brock 2 94 Or. 15,
653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing
nighttime search without any showing of reasonable
necessity not invalid and suppression not required,
when legislature had considered and declined to
enact specific exclusionary rule for such
circumstances).
The historical character of a nighttime search
further persuades us that violation of the statute
requires suppression. Ssg, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283-84, 69
L.Ed. 543 (1925) (question of reasonableness of a
search must be viewed not only from the particular
facts, but also with an eye toward what was
considered reasonable at the time of the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment). Searches of homes were
soundly condemned by the drafters of the Bill of
Rights and under English common law. £££ United
States ex rel. Bovance v. Mvers. 398 F.2d 896, 89798 (3rd Cir. 1968). "Night-time search was the
evil in its most obnoxious form." Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 210, 81 S.Ct. 473, 496, 5 L.Ed.2d 492
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
propriety of executing a search of an occupied
dwelling at night is "sensitively related to the
reasonableness" prong of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th
Cir. 1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho
37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) ("entry into an
occupied dwelling in the middle of the night is
clearly a greater invasion of privacy than entry
executing during the daytime").
CONCLUSION
The respondent's personal reasonable expectations of
privacy were violated.

They searched her purse and thus gave

her standing to contest the validity of the search.
To abandon property you must have the intent to do so.
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The facts surrounding the defendant's leaving her purse do
not support a finding of an intent to abandon her property.
The court should find the search was unlawful and the
evidence found pursuant to said search inadmissible at trial
It should be suppressed.
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